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 Groundwater Pumping by Heterogeneous Users 
 
Abstract 
Farm size is a significant determinant of both groundwater irrigated farm acreage and 
groundwater irrigation application rates per acre.  This paper analyzes the patterns of 
groundwater exploitation when resource users in the area overlying a common aquifer are 
heterogeneous.  In the presence of user heterogeneity, the common resource problem 
consists of inefficient dynamic and spatial allocation of groundwater because it impacts 
income distribution not only across periods but also across farmers.  Under competitive 
allocation, smaller farmers pump groundwater faster if farmers have a constant marginal 
periodic utility of income.  However, it is possible that larger farmers pump faster if the 
Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk-aversion is sufficiently decreasing in wealth.  A 
greater farm-size inequality may either moderate or amplify income inequality among 
farmers.  Its effect on welfare depends on the curvature properties of the agricultural 
output function and the farmer utility of income.  Also, it is shown that a flat-rate quota 
policy that limits the quantity of groundwater extraction per unit land may have 
unintended consequences for the income distribution among farmers. 
 
Keywords: common property resource, groundwater, majorization 
 
  2Groundwater Pumping by Heterogeneous Users 
1. Introduction 
Theoretical models of groundwater extraction typically assume that the resource is non-
exclusive or that the resource users are identical.  This, along with the assumption of 
instantaneous interseasonal transmissivity, simplifies the analysis because there exists a 
representative user.  However, this approach does not take into account the spatial 
distribution of users, and the dependence of individual groundwater stocks on the history 
of past extractions (Brozovic et al 2003, Koundouri 2004).  As a result, the existing 
models have relatively little to say about the patterns of groundwater exploitation when 
resource users are heterogeneous.   
This is an important issue because irrigated agriculture, one of the major 
consumers of groundwater, and by far the largest consumer of fresh surface water, is 
comprised of farms of different sizes (Schaible 2004).  Farm size is a significant 
determinant of both groundwater irrigated farm acreage and groundwater irrigation 
application rates per acre (see Table 1).
1  On average, larger farms tend to be the more 
intensive and extensive-margin irrigation operations.  But in some states the relationships 
are either non-monotone or inversely monotone.  For example, in Nevada and Oregon, 
smaller farms using groundwater have, on average, higher application rates per acre.     
  It is well known that, to the extent that groundwater is a common property 
resource, private decisions lead to inefficient allocation.
2  However, it is not clear 
whether user heterogeneity alleviates or exacerbates the so-called curse of the commons.  
Furthermore, the effects of water management policies on irrigation efficiency and farm 
incomes likely depend on farmland ownership structure.  Specifically, we ask the 
following questions.  What are the determinants of the relationship between farm size and 
groundwater use intensity?  How does the distribution of farm sizes in the area influence 
the efficiency of groundwater allocation?  What are the distributional impacts of farmland 
ownership structure and water management policies? 
                                                 
1 A farm is categorized as small, medium, large, and very large, based on total annual farm sales, 
respectively, less than $100,000, between $100,000 and $250,000, between $250,000 and $500,000, and in 
excess of $500,000.  For example, in 1998 the distribution of irrigated farms in the western states consisted 
of 65 percent small, 15.6 percent medium, 9.7 percent large, and 9.5 percent very large farms (USDA). 
2 This result holds unless the aquifer is relatively large in comparison to total groundwater use, users can 
cooperate, or hydraulic conductivities are so small that the resource is effectively private (Feinerman and 
Knapp 1983). 
  3 
Table 1. Average groundwater applied per acre (acre feet per acre) and 
groundwater irrigated acres, by farm size and state, for farms using groundwater in 
selected western states surveyed in 1998  
   Farm size class based on farm sales   
State  Small Medium Large  Very  Large 
  Per acre  Acres  Per acre  Acres  Per acre  Acres  Per acre  Acres 
Arizona   2.96 *  53 ***  3.93 *  255 *  3.79 *  378 **  3.71 *  879 * 
California   1.63 *  38 ***  1.73 *  125 **  2.08 *  343 *  2.51 *  628 * 
Colorado   1.68 *  98 **  1.35 *  335 *  1.70 *  604 *  1.58 *  1,184 * 
Idaho   1.33 *  113 **  1.96 *  347 **  1.36 *  258 **  1.64 *  1,548 * 
Kansas   0.88 *  342 **  1.49 *  290 *  1.40 *  531 *  1.35 *  1,258 * 
Montana   1.61 *  10 **  3.23 **  269 *  1.09 *  432 **  0.91 **  781 ** 
Nebraska   0.64 *  183 *  0.76 *  325 *  0.87 *  686 *  0.93 *  895 * 
Nevada   3.51 *  129 **  3.17 *  360 *  2.89 *  582 *  2.79 *  1,612 * 
New Mexico   1.79 *  53 **  1.86 *  371 *  2.32 *  471 *  2.44 *  972 * 
Oklahoma   1.39 *  113 *  1.35 *  339 **  1.47 *  702 *  1.48 *  1,247 * 
Oregon   1.84 *  30 **  1.76 *  169 *  1.75 *  257 *  1.54 *  405 * 
Texas   1.30 *  154 **  1.31 *  456 *  1.30 *  715 *  1.43 *  1,550 * 
Farm average:   1.30 *  85 *  1.26 *  304 *  1.33 *  552 *  1.71 *  932 * 
 
Note: * , **, and *** indicate the coefficient of variation (CV), respectively, between 0 to 25, 25 to 50, and 
50 to 100. CV values were computed as the [Standard Error of Estimate/Estimate] x 100. 
Source: Farm and Ranch Irrigation Survey (1998), National Agricultural Statistics Service, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (1999). Data were summarized by the Economic Research Service, USDA. 
 
In a two-period framework, we show that the relationship between farm size and 
pumping rates depends on the farmers’ preferences over income.  If the periodic marginal 
utility of income is constant, smaller farmers pump groundwater faster.  However, the 
converse may hold, if the periodic marginal utility is concave and the Arrow-Pratt 
measure of relative risk aversion is decreasing in wealth.
3  This reflects the trade-off 
between two effects.  On the one hand, a farmer operating on a smaller acreage 
effectively owns a smaller share of the aquifer, and perceives groundwater as a “more” 
common resource compared with a farmer with a larger acreage.  Therefore, smaller 
farmers tend to pump faster.  On the other hand, they may face a greater differential 
                                                 
3 Even though there is no uncertainty in the environment studied in the paper, it is convenient to formulate 
our results using measures of risk aversion and the intensity of the precautionary saving motive such as, 
respectively, the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk aversion and prudence (Gollier 2004).  In a non-stochastic 
framework, these coefficients measure the strengths of the inter-temporal income smoothing motive (i.e., 
the diminishing marginal utility of income).  Adding uncertainty will not change the qualitative nature of 
our results. There is an empirical literature on the relationship between farmers’ risk preferences and their 
dynamic use of groundwater (e.g., Antle (1983), Antle (1987), and Koundouri et al (forthcoming)) as well 
as on the effects of risk preferences on farmer’s reaction to water quota policies (e.g., Groom et al 
(forthcoming)). 
  4between marginal utilities of present and future income, and therefore, have a greater 
incentive to save groundwater for future use. 
  Turning to the effects of greater inequality in farm sizes on welfare, we find that 
there are dynamic and spatial components.  The dynamic component refers to the effect 
of farm-size inequality on the average pumping rate, or the speed with which the aquifer 
is depleted.  The spatial component refers to the effect of farm-size inequality on the 
distribution of pumping rates and income across farmers in each irrigation season.  The 
conditions under which these effects can be signed require structure on farmers’ marginal 
utility of income, and the degree of concavity of output and marginal output functions.   
  The speed with which the aquifer is depleted can either increase or decrease with 
farm-size inequality.  The average pumping rate increases if the acreage is shifted 
towards farmers who pump faster than the average farmer.  The converse holds, if the 
acreage is shifted towards more efficient users.  Conditions under which the effect of any 
increase in acreage inequality on the average pumping rate is known, assure that farm 
size bears a monotone relationship with the pumping rate and order the sensitivities of the 
pumping rate to farm size for slow and fast users.  Suppose that farmers are risk-neutral 
and the small farms under the new land ownership distribution are not “too small”.   Then 
the conditions can be conveniently stated in terms of the curvature properties of the first 
derivative of the function that relates income to water use for a fixed stock of 
groundwater (i.e., the inverse of the agricultural output function with respect to demand 
for groundwater).  We find that the average pumping rate decreases (increases) with 
farm-size inequality depending on whether the marginal inverse output is log-concave 
(log-convex).   
Even if the average pumping rate does not change, social welfare can also either 
increase or decrease with farm-size inequality.  On the one hand, keeping the 
groundwater allocation fixed, a greater farm-size inequality implies a greater income 
inequality among farmers, and hence, a decline in social welfare.  On the other hand, a 
greater farm-size inequality may imply a lesser income inequality.  This is because 
smaller farmers gain a greater strategic advantage as they are able to poach more 
groundwater per unit land than their larger neighbors.   
  5For methodological reasons, we differentiate between the cases when farmers’ 
marginal periodic utility of income is constant, and when it is decreasing.  In the former 
case, under constant returns to scale farming technology, farm-size heterogeneity does 
not contribute to welfare loss beyond that caused by the curse of the commons.  In the 
latter case, the analysis needs to disentangle the pure income redistribution effect of the 
land ownership structure, keeping the allocation of groundwater fixed, from its effects on 
the equilibrium average pumping rate and the spatial distribution of groundwater 
withdrawals across farmers.   
   Notably, this insight may contribute to the continuing debate on the magnitude of 
the welfare difference between optimal control rules and competitive outcomes (Gisser 
1983, Gisser and Sanchez 1980, Koundouri 2004).  Provencher and Burt (1993) identify 
three sources of inefficiency associated with groundwater use in agriculture: stock, 
pumping cost, and risk externalities.  In the presence of user heterogeneity, income 
distribution externality is added to this list.  The income distribution externality arises 
when the rates of groundwater extraction differ across farms overlying a common 
aquifer.  This externality can be both positive and negative, depending on whether 
smaller farms appropriate, on a per acre basis, a greater share of the common resource.  
Small and large farmers can be thought of as, respectively, low and high income groups.  
And so, a common resource such as groundwater may become a natural vehicle for 
wealth transfer, and can either neutralize or amplify income inequality caused by the 
inequality in farmland holdings. 
Taking a policy perspective, we find that policies that affect the farmland 
ownership and management structures may have unexpected repercussions on the 
efficiency of groundwater exploitation.  It turns out that, even within the simple 
framework analyzed in the paper, one needs a rather detailed knowledge of the farmers’ 
utility function and farming and irrigation technologies to make useful policy 
recommendations.  Using an example of a flat-rate quota policy, we show that policy-
induced gains and losses are unequally distributed across farmers. This heterogeneity, 
and the arising political economy considerations, may adversely influence the adoption of 
policies that lead to overall efficiency gains and raise the average farm income.  
 
  6Literature Review 
Knapp and Vaux (1982) and Feinerman (1988) are among the few studies that consider 
equity and distributional effects of groundwater management schemes.  Knapp and Vaux 
(1982) consider groups of farmers differentiated by their derived demand for water, and 
present an empirical example that demonstrates that some users may suffer substantial 
losses from quota allocation policies even though the group as a whole benefits.  
Feinerman (1988) extends their analysis and considers a variety of management tools 
including pump taxes, quotas, subsidies, and markets for water rights.  Using simulations 
calibrated to Kern County, California, the author concludes that while the welfare 
distributional effects on user groups may be substantial, the negotiations between the 
policy-makers and the users are likely to be difficult because the attractiveness of policies 
varies across users and is sensitive to the parameters.  However, following Gisser and 
Sanchez (1980), these studies ignore the stock externality, and assume that under 
competition users behave myopically and base their decisions solely on the consideration 
of their immediate (periodic) profits.  Also, there is no investigation of the effect of the 
extent of user heterogeneity on the properties of competitive allocation. 
There is a rather thin literature in development economics that is concerned with 
the effect of inequality in land holdings on groundwater exploitation.  Motivated by the 
role of groundwater in sustaining the Green revolution and developing agrarian 
economies, Foster and Rosenzweig (2005) consider the patterns of groundwater 
extraction in rural India.  They develop a dynamic model of groundwater extraction that 
captures the relationships between growth in agricultural productivity, the distribution of 
land ownership, water table depth, and tubewell failure.  Using data on household 
irrigation assets including tubewell depth as a proxy for irrigation intensity, they find that 
large landowners are more likely to construct tubewells, but their tubewells tend to be 
less deep than those dug by smaller landowners. The authors conclude that this is 
indicative of a free-riding effect in the sense that large farmers are less able to effectively 
poach the water from neighboring farmers by lowering the water-table under their own 
lands.  They also find evidence of land consolidation as a way to improve efficiency of 
groundwater exploitation.   
  7In the context of irrigated agriculture in developed economies, where farmers 
have better access to capital markets and modern irrigation technologies, we focus on the 
simpler irrigation application rate decision.  A two-period framework with a “quasi-
bathtub” aquifer is particularly well suited to fully work out the equilibrium effects of 
farm-size inequality on the welfare difference between the competitive and efficient 
allocations.  Given the seasonality of production in irrigated agriculture, we assume that a 
groundwater resource is quasi-bathtub as it acquires features of a common property 
resource over time.
 4  This assumption is justified if all wells are spaced so that the 
localized cones of depression caused by pumping from neighboring wells do not overlap 
within each irrigation season.  However, the main insights and policy implications 
obtained in this framework carry on to more realistic settings. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we present a simple 
two-period model of groundwater extraction in the presence of farm-size heterogeneity.  
In Section 3, we consider the social planner’s solution.  In Section 4, we analyze 
equilibrium allocation and the effect of farm-size inequality on the pumping rates and 
farm income when farmers’ marginal periodic utility of income is constant.  In Section 5, 
we consider equilibrium allocation when farmers’ marginal periodic utility of income is 
decreasing.  In Section 6, we consider a flat-rate quota policy that illustrates political 
economy issues that arise in the presence of user heterogeneity. 
 
2. Model 
For simplicity, we focus on the stock, cost, and income distribution externalities.  We 
consider intensive-margin decisions taking the distribution of irrigated acres across 
farmers as exogenous.  With slight modifications, the model can be extended to include 
extensive-margin (the share of acreage allocated to irrigated crops) decisions.  Farmers 
                                                 
4 This happens when the time period during which groundwater is extracted is relatively short, and does not 
allow for seepage from one point in the aquifer (such as a well or a pool) to another.  However, the water 
level tends to be more uniform throughout the aquifer in the long run.  We refer to the latter as a “quasi-
bathtub” property: the resource at each extraction point is private within each period, but the aquifer 
becomes a “bathtub” across periods. This seems plausible whenever the irrigation season is considerably 
shorter than the time that elapses between the two seasons.  However, there is a large variation in local 
hydrologic properties such as the aquifer’s storativity and transmissivity values as well as well-spacing 
requirements that vary from 4 miles in parts of Kansas to less than 300 feet in Texas (e.g., Brozovic et al 
2003, Kaiser and Skiller 2001).  
  8are identical except for the distribution of land ownership, and irrigation technology is 
constant returns to scale.  All profits are derived from agricultural outputs using 
groundwater for irrigation on a fixed land area, and farmers hold exclusive pumping 
rights on their land.  The individual groundwater stocks are private during each irrigation 
season because there is no intra-seasonal well interference.  However, the groundwater is 
an inter-seasonal common property resource based on the groundwater hydrology over a 
longer time interval.  The following assumptions are standard (e.g., Negri 1989): 
1.  (Fixed land ownership) The distribution of farmland ownership does not change 
over time. 
2.  (Constant returns to scale and homogenous land quality) The agricultural 
production function is constant returns to scale.  Land quality is identical across 
all farms.  Inputs other than groundwater including the choice of irrigation 
technology, fertilize, crops, etc., are optimized conditional on the rate of water 
extraction.  Output and input prices, including energy costs, are exogenous. 
3.  (Pumping cost) The total cost of groundwater extraction per acre increases with 
the pumping rate and decreases with the level of the water table (or the stock of 
groundwater). 
4.  (User location is irrelevant) The aquifer is confined, non-rechargeable, 
homogenous, and isotropic.  The groundwater basin has parallel sides with a flat 
bottom.          
5.  (Quasi-bathtub) There are no intra-seasonal lateral flows of groundwater across 
farms.  However, inter-seasonal changes in groundwater level are transmitted 
instantaneously to all users (i.e., the groundwater has an infinite rate of 
transmissivity during the time elapsed from one irrigation season until next).
5   
6.  (Two periods) There are only two periods (irrigation seasons), and farmer 
preferences over income are additively separable across periods.   
Provencher and Burt (1994) also consider and provide justifications for a two-period 
framework.  The assumption that the aquifer is non-renewable is for expositional 
convenience, and a positive rate of recharge can be easily incorporated.  The groundwater 
                                                 
5 Brozovic et al (2003) provide a detailed discussion of the consequences of this assumption. 
  9extractions are the gross quantity of water withdrawn if some fraction of the water 
percolates back to the stock.  Next we introduce the notation.  
 
Aquifer 
The total stock of groundwater stored in the aquifer in the beginning of period 1 is 
, where   is the height of the water table in period 1, and  1 1 Ah x = 1 h A is the size of the 
area measured in acres.  Let   denote the set of acres.  The hydraulic heads of 
the water table under each acre are the same in the beginning of each period,   
   and  .  Let   denote the quantity of groundwater applied in period 
 on acre  .  By the quasi-bathtub assumption, the per acre quantity of groundwater 
withdrawn in each period cannot exceed the per acre stock or   acre-feet: 
} ,..., 1 { A L =
t j t i h h , , =
t h = L j i ∈ ∀ , 2 , 1 = t t i u ,
t i
t h
   for all  t t i h u ≤ , L i∈  and  2 , 1 = t .            ( 1 )  
Let   denote the average pumping in period 1.  Since there is no recharge, 








1 2 x x = 1 Au − , and the level of the 
water table is  
  .           ( 2 )   1 1 2 u h h − =
 
Land ownership 
There are   farmers (users of groundwater) who are located in the area overlying the 
aquifer and grow irrigated crops.  Farmer k  farms acres  , and let     
denote the number of irrigable acres owned by farmer  , where 
n
L Lk ⊆ k A | | k L =
k A A
n
k k = ∑ =1 .  We will 
refer to the set of acres   as “farm  ” or “farmer k ”.  For concreteness, we hold that 
farm indices are ordered by farm size, 
k L k
n A A A ≤ ≤ ≤ ... 2 1 .  In what follows, in the doubly 
subscripted variables, the first symbol identifies the acre, and the second identifies the 
period,  .  Variables with one subscript typically refer to the aggregate values in the 
specified period, unless they are farm-specific and invariant across periods.  We will use 
letters 
2 , 1 = t
j i,  to index acres, and letters   to index farmers.  l k,
 
 
  10Production technology 
The periodic per acre benefit of water consumption net of all costs including groundwater 
pumping cost is 
  ,             ( 3 )   ) , ( , t t i h u g
where  g  is strictly increasing and concave.  While irrigation increases yield, a higher 
groundwater stock decreases the cost of pumping due to a decrease in pumping lift, and 
increases the efficiency of irrigation by permitting a more flexible application schedule.  
Agricultural production technology is constant returns to scale (farm size), and land 
quality is homogenous:  ) , , , ( i A h u g k ) , , , ( j A h u g l = .  For simplicity, the rainfall and 
surface water supply are the same on all farms in both periods.  For example, (3) can take 
the following form: 
qz h u c z h u py h u g z − − = ) , ( ) , , ( max ) , ( , 
where   is the per unit price of the crop,   is yield, and   is the cost of pumping 
groundwater,   is the vector of other inputs, and   is the price vector of other inputs.    
For notational convenience, let  
p y c
z q
 )           ( 4 )   , ( ) ( h h g h f u = ) , ( h h gh +
denote the marginal per acre benefit of water consumption evaluated at the point of 
depletion of an individual groundwater stock.
6  By concavity of  ,  g 0 ) ( < ′ h f  
. ) , 0 ( 1 h h∈ ∀
7
 Let  v denote the periodic utility of farm income,  0 , 0 ≤ ′ ′ > ′ v v .  Each farmer 
maximizes the sum of utilities of the whole-farm revenue in each period:  
   subject to (1) and (2).    (5)  ∑∑ =∈ ∈ =
2 , 1 , } { ) ) , ( ( max
, tL i t t i u k
k k L i t i h u g v π
For simplicity, there is no discounting of future income. 
 
3. Social planner 
Before we turn to the analysis of the competitive allocation by non-cooperating users, we 
                                                 
6 The subscripts on functions denote differentiation with respect to the lettered arguments. 
7 All of our results continue to hold under weaker technical conditions:  0 < uu g ,  , and  0 < hh g = ′ ) (h f  
, which are implied by concavity of  ) , ( h h guu ) , ( h h ghh + 0 ) , ( 2 < − h h guh g. 
  11characterize the efficient allocation.  The social planner chooses   to maximize 
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t i h u g v W  subject to (1) and (2).    (6) 
The following result shows that the efficient allocation of groundwater 
compensates for income inequality caused by the inequality in farm sizes.  The common 
resource may serve as a vehicle to decrease income inequality by redistributing income 
from larger farmers to smaller farmers.  This effect is absent if either farm sizes are 
identical, or farmers are risk-neutral (periodic utility is linear in income).  Note that 
optimal groundwater consumption in the final period exhausts the remaining stock on 




i = = L j i ∈ ∀ , , because 
the income utility and water benefit functions are strictly increasing.  And so, the focus is 
solely on period 1 pumping.  All proofs that are not in the text are in the Appendix. 
 
Proposition 1.  (Efficient pumping) Efficient allocation of groundwater is  




i u u 1 , 1 , = L j i ∈ ∀ , , and is determined by  




i u u h f h u g
if either farmers are risk-neutral,  0 = ′ ′ v , or acreage is uniformly distributed across 
farmers,   for  ;  n A Ak / = n k ,..., 1 =
(b) characterized by smaller farmers pumping groundwater faster,  , for 
,  ,  ,  if farmers are risk-averse (decreasing marginal utility of 
income),  . 
≥
s
j u 1 ,
s
i u 1 ,
k L j∈ l L i∈ l k <
0 ≤ ′ ′ v
 
(7) is easiest to interpret for the special case when the water benefit depends only 
on water use, u.  In this case, it is efficient to equalize the marginal benefits of water use 
in the two periods:  , which implies that    .  This 
is equivalent to the assertion that, in the absence of a pumping cost externality and 
inequality of income across farmers, the efficient solution distributes the available water 
equally across the two periods on each farm. 




i u u h g u g − = 2 / 1 1 , h u
s
i = L i∈ ∀
  12  It is convenient to differentiate between the case when farmers’ per period 
marginal utility of income is (1) constant (i.e., farmers are risk-neutral), and (2) 
decreasing (i.e., farmers are risk-averse).  In the former case, from the social planner’s 
point of view, there is no inherent inefficiency of income distribution due to a non-
uniform distribution of acreage across farmers.  However, such inefficiency may still 
arise in competitive equilibrium.  In the latter case, as is demonstrated in Part (b) of 
Proposition 1, the social planner faces a trade-off between dynamic and distributional 
sources of inefficiencies.   
From a policy perspective, an important insight of the analysis to follow is that, in 
the presence of farmer heterogeneity, competitive allocations go beyond the curse of the 
commons, and affect income inequality as well.  The welfare difference between the 
optimal and competitive allocations may be particularly large, when, from the societal 
point of view, the income distribution matters.  This happens when the equilibrium 
distribution of pumping rates across heterogeneous farmers amplifies the income 
inequality caused by size inequality.  However, the competitive allocation may also 
moderate the inherent inequality in income distribution caused by the inequality in land 
ownership, or even change its sign, whereas total incomes over two periods earned by 
smaller farmers exceed that of larger ones (see footnote 10). 
 
4. Risk-neutral producers  
In this section, we consider the case of risk-neutral farmers,  0 = ′ ′ v .  In Section 4.1, we 
characterize competitive equilibrium.  In Section 4.2, we analyze the effect of inequality 
in farm sizes on the groundwater stock and the distribution of income. 
 
4.1. Equilibrium 
Farmers are non-cooperative, and each farmer takes the quantity of water pumped by 
others in each period as given.  In period 2, all farmers exhaust the available stocks of 
groundwater on each acre, so that   for  2
*
2 , h ui = L i∈ ∀ .  By (5), in period 1 farmer  ’s 
payoff is 
k
  = k π ) , ( ) , ( max 2 2 1 1 , } { 1 , h h g h u g
k k L i i L i i u + ∑∈ ∈  subject to (1) and (2).    (8) 
  13Next we characterize competitive allocation.  Differentiating (8), the best response by 
farmer   on acre  ,  , satisfies  k k L i∈
*
1 , i u
  , if  − ) , (
*
1 , x u g i u ) ( 2 h f ak 0 =
*
1 , i u 1 h ≤ , and 
*
1 , i u 1 h = , if otherwise    (9) 
where   is the share of the aquifer that can be captured by farmer  .  (9) can 
be written in a more compact form 
A A a k k / = k
  ,  
*
1 , i u , min[ 1 h = )] ); ( ( 1 2
1 h h f a g k u
−
k L i∈ ∀       ( 1 0 )  
where   is the inverse of   obtained by treating   as a parameter.  Note 
that per acre pumping rates on each farm are identical   
) (.;
1 h gu




1 , j i u u = k L j i ∈ ∀ , .  Summing 
pumping rates (10) over all   and  n k ,..., 1 = k L i∈ , and substituting (2), yields 
  ,      (11) 
*
1 u ∑ = =
n
k k h a
1 1, min[ )] ); ( ( 1
*
1 1
1 h u h f a g k u −
−









1 ) / 1 (
g , (11) uniquely determines the aggregate pumping in period 1,  .  Together (10) 




Proposition 2.  (Competitive allocation) Suppose that farmers are risk-neutral.  
Competitive equilibrium exists, it is unique, and is given by (10) and (11).  The average 
pumping rate is higher than the socially efficient average  rate,  . Also, smaller 
farmers pump faster than larger farmers,  , for any 





1 , i u
*
1 , j u k L i∈ ,  l L j∈ ,  .  l k <
 
Comparing the first-order conditions that characterize the efficient and competitive 
allocations, (7) and (9), respectively, shows that the discrepancy between them arises 
along both spatial and temporal dimensions.  That is the competitive allocation leads to 
an inefficiently high aggregate pumping in period 1, which entails an inefficient 
allocation of groundwater across periods.  Nonetheless, it is possible that individual 
farmers extract groundwater at a slower rate than the socially efficient average rate, i.e. 
 for some i (see Section 4.2.4 and Figure 1b).  Also, unless all farmers are 
identical, the competitive allocation results in inefficient pumping rates across farmers in 
s
i u u 1
*
1 , ≤
  14period 1.  Recall that, by Proposition 1(a), efficiency requires that the per acre irrigation 
application rates be identical when farmers are risk-neutral. 
Under risk-neutrality, smaller farmers always deviate more from the socially efficient 
allocation.  However, it is not clear whether the non-uniformity of the distribution of land 
ownership, in and of itself, leads to a loss or gain of total farm income.  As we show next, 
the effects of the inequality in farm sizes on the groundwater stock and farm income 
depend on rather subtle properties of the agricultural production function. 
 
4.2. Inequality in farm sizes 
Next we introduce the measure of inequality that is used to model an increase in the 
concentration of land ownership (a smaller share of farmers owns a larger share of land).  
In Section 4.2.2, we analyze the effect of inequality in farm sizes on the remaining 
groundwater stock.  In Section 4.2.3, we analyze the effect of inequality in farm sizes on 
total income.  In Section 4.2.4, we present an example that illustrates our findings. 
 
4.2.1. Measuring inequality 
To model the effect of inequality in farm size on groundwater exploitation we use the 
majorization order.  A comprehensive treatment of majorization can be found in Marshall 
and Olkin (1979).  Let  n B B B ≤ ≤ ≤ ... 2 1  represent an alternative distribution of land 
ownership among farmers, where  A B
n
k k = ∑ =1 .  
Definition.  Real vector  A
r
 is majorized by B
r
, denoted  B A
m r r
≤ , if ∑ =
l
k k A













Majorization is a tool to compare the dissimilarity within the components of 
vectors, and is ideally suited to compare the inequality of income distributions.  We will 
also need a related notion of Schur-convex and Schur-concave functions.  A real-valued 
function  ) (A y
r
 is called Schur-convex if  B A
m r r




≤ , and  ) (A y
r
 is 
Schur-concave, if   is Schur-convex.  In our analysis, we will appeal to the  ) (A y
r
−
  15following important property of Schur-convex functions.  Suppose that 
.  Then   is Schur-concave if and only if   is concave.    ∑ = =
n
k k A z A y






4.2.2. Inequality of farm sizes and groundwater stock 
Let   denote the index of concavity of agricultural output 
function, and   denote the index of concavity of the marginal 
output function of a farmer with technology   in period 1.  Note that 
) , ( / ) , ( 1 1 h u g h u g R u uu − =
) , ( / ) , ( 1 1 h u g h u g P uu uuu − =
) , ( 1 h u g R  is the 
Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion, and P  is the coefficient of absolute 
prudence, if   is interpreted as the utility of wealth measured in acre-feet of 
water.
) , ( 1 h u g
8
 
Proposition 3.  Suppose that farmers are risk-neutral.  Then under more unequal 
distribution of farm sizes,  B A
m r r
≤ , the groundwater stock in period 2 




2 B h A h
r r
≤ P R ≥ 2 ;   




2 B h A h
r r
≥ 1 b )) ( ( / ) , (
*
2 1 1 A h f h h gu
r
≥ , i.e. the smallest farm 
under the new land ownership distribution is not “too small” and (ii)  P R ≤ 2 .    
 
  The inequality in land ownership creates a trade-off in terms of its effect on the 
pumping decisions in period 1.  A heavier left tail of the acreage distribution implies that 
there are more farmers, who own a smaller share of the aquifer and tend to pump faster 
than the average farmer.  However, a heavier right tail implies the opposite.  Therefore, 
ascertaining the effect of any increase in acreage inequality on the competitive allocation 
requires structure on the farm-size sensitivity of the difference in pumping rates between 




1 , j i u u − k L i∈ ,  l L j∈ ,  l k A A < .
9   
                                                 
8 Comparative statics results for the portfolio selection problem, along with interesting intuition, that are 
stated in terms of the Arrow-Pratt coefficients of risk-aversion and prudence can be found in Gollier 
(2004).  
9 The farm-size sensitivity of the difference in pumping rates across farms is  ) ( / ) ( k k k a u a u a ′ ′ ′ , where  
. If the pumping rate differential, u = ) ( k a u 1 1 2
1 ) ); ( ( h h h f a g k u <
− ′, is increasing (decreasing), the sensitivity 
is negative (positive). 
  16Condition (a) states that, when the aquifer is full, the agricultural output,  , 
is in a sense more concave than the marginal output,  .  Then the perceived 
benefit from a more stable inter-seasonal groundwater use pattern increases with size at 
an accelerating rate, and a greater inequality stimulates, on average, a slower pumping 
rate.  Note that condition   is equivalent to log-concavity (log-convexity) of the 
first derivative of the demand for water with respect to output when the aquifer is full, 
, where   is the inverse of agricultural output 
function obtained by treating  the stock of groundwater,  , as a parameter. 
) (., 1 h g
) (., 1 h gu
P R ) ( 2 ≥ ≤
) ; ( 1
1 h y gy
− )} ; ( : { ) ; ( 1 1
1 h u g y u h y g = =
−
1 h
To guarantee that the average pumping rate increases, we need an additional 
condition (i) in Part (b) because the aquifer is a quasi-bathtub (see constraint (1)).  This 
condition puts a limit on the increase in the size of large farms.  It implies that, under the 
new distribution of land ownership, the number of farmers, who grow irrigated crops is 
the same,  , and that, under the initial distribution of land ownership, no farmer 
depleted her stock of groundwater in period 1, 
0 1 > B
1
*
1 , ) ( h A ui <
r
 for all  1 L i∈ .  
 
4.2.3. Farm-size inequality and farm income 
Here we consider the effect of the inequality in farm acreage on total farm income 
attained by the competitive allocation.  In the case of risk-neutral farmers, (6) becomes  








k k g A







1 h h g h h h f a g k u +
− ,    (12) 




1 1 u h − = ) (A W
c r
 symbolizes the dependence of total farm 
income (agricultural output) on the distribution of land ownership among farmers. 
  The farm-size inequality affects both the groundwater stock in period 2 (dynamic 
allocation) and the distribution of groundwater application rates across farms in period 1 
(spatial allocation).  Keeping everything else equal, a more stable inter-seasonal pattern 
of groundwater use increases total farm income.  The distributional effect of farm-size 
inequality on farm income is more difficult because a higher variability in farm sizes may 
or may not lead to a higher variability in the per acre pumping rates (see Proposition 3).     
 
  17Proposition 4.  Suppose that farmers are risk-neutral.  Then under more unequal 
distribution of farm sizes,  B A
m r r
≤ , total farm income 
(a) decreases,  ) ( ) ( B W A W
c c r r




2 B h A h
r r
≥ ;   
(b) increases,  ) ( ) ( B W A W
c c r r
≤ , if (i) the smallest farm under the new land 
ownership distribution is not “too small”,  1 b )) ( ( / ) , (
*
2 1 1 A h f h h gu
r
≥ , (ii)  , and 
(iii)  .    
P R ≤ 3








Conditions in (a) guarantee that the unequal distribution of farm acreage 
aggravates both the distributional (a(i)) and dynamic (a(ii)) inefficiencies, that are 
associated with the competitive allocation.  Condition a(i) requires that the net benefit of 
irrigation when the aquifer is full,  , is in a sense more concave than the marginal 
benefit,  .  Then a greater inequality in farm sizes stimulates a greater variability 
in (acreage-weighted) pumping rates and lowers total output.  Observe that a(i) is less 
stringent than (a) in Proposition 3.  This is because the net benefit of irrigation,  , 
is concave in  , which adds additional curvature, and thus, on average, a smaller (or 
positive) farm-size sensitivity of the spatial pumping rate differential suffices to cause a 
total output loss. 
) , ( 1 h u g
) , ( 1 h u gu
) , ( 1 h u g
u
Part (b) has a similar interpretation.  Condition b(i) is the same as in Proposition 
3.  But now sufficient condition b(ii) is more stringent compared with b(ii) in Proposition 
3.  This is because a negative and “sufficiently” large (in absolute value) farm-size 
sensitivity of the spatial pumping rate differential is required in order to assuredly raise 
total output.  Note that condition  P R ) ( 3 ≥ ≤  is equivalent to concavity (convexity) of the 
first derivative of the inverse output function (i.e., demand for water as a function of 
output) when the aquifer is full,  .  ) ; ( 1
1 h y gy
−
Combining Propositions 3(b) and 4(a) yields 
 
Proposition 5.  Suppose that farmers are risk-neutral.  Then under more unequal 
distribution of farm sizes,  B A
m r r
≤ , total farm income decreases,  ) ( ) ( B W A W
c c r r
≥ , if 
.    R P R 3 2 ≤ ≤
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Sufficient conditions under which more unequal distribution of farm sizes has an 
unambiguously positive effect on total farm income cannot be obtained in this way.  To 
guarantee a lesser inequality in pumping rates, the pumping rate spatial differential, 
, must be “sufficiently” decreasing (in absolute value) with farm size.  In contrast, 
to guarantee a more stable average pumping rate, the pumping rate spatial differential 
must be increasing or “slightly” decreasing (in absolute value) with farm size.   
) ( k a u′
  Furthermore, as clear from the proof of Proposition 4 (see (A1) in Appendix), the 
sign of  k k A ∂ ∂ / π  is ambiguous.  Therefore, it is possible that smaller farmers earn more 
total income than larger farmers,  l k π π ≥  for  l k < .
10  This may happen because smaller 
farmers are in a better strategic position to take advantage of the common property 
resource as they are able to steal more groundwater per unit of land than their larger 
neighbors.  The following example illustrates. 
 
4.2.4. Small and large farms: an example 
Let  , 
γ ) ( ) , ( z u h u g + = ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ γ ,  1 5 . 0 h z − ≥ , and  0 = ′ ′ v .  By Proposition 1, the efficient 
allocation of groundwater across acres and seasons is invariant to the distribution of land 
ownership, and is given by   for  1 1 , 5 . 0 h u
s
i = L i∈ .  The maximal regional farm income is 
.   
γ ) 5 . 0 ( 2 1 z h A W
s + =
For simplicity, all farms fall in one of the two categories: small and large.  The 
size of small farms is s acres,  s Ak =  for  m k ,..., 1 = , and the size of large farms is   
acres,   for  , where 
l
l Ak = n m k ,..., 1 + = l s ≤ .  The number of small farms is m, and the 
number of large farms is  , where  m n− A l m n ms = − + ) ( .  By (10) and (11) equilibrium 
pumping in period 1 is 
)] ) ( 1 ( )
1
) 1 (
( ) ( , min[
) 1 /( 1
1

















h ui  for  k L i∈ ,  ,  m k ,..., 1 =
                                                 
10 Of course, larger farmers always have higher total revenues in period 2.  But smaller farmers have more 
intensive-margin operations and higher per acre revenues in period 1.  The differential in total revenues 
between small and large farmers in period 1 can be positive, and even, exceed the magnitude of the 
negative differential in total revenues in period 2. 
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 for  k L i∈  and  n m k ,..., 1 + =  
where  .  )] ) / )( ( ) / (
) 1 /( ) 1 /( − − − + =
γ γ γ γ A l m n A s m E
For concreteness, we consider a special case of an increase in farm size inequality 
whereas small farms get uniformly smaller and large farms get uniformly larger.  Note 
that   for  )) ( , ; ( )) ( , ; ( s l m s A s l m s A
m ′ ′ ′ ′ ≤ ′ ′
r r
s s ′ ′ > ′ , where  ) /( ) ( ) ( s n ms A s l − − = .  Clearly, a 
uniform shift of acreage from small farms to large farms, keeping the number of farms in 
each size category fixed, constitutes an increase in farm size inequality.  We consider the 
effect of increasing the gap between the acreage on small and large farms,  , 
keeping the number of each type of farms, m, fixed.   
0 ≥ − = Δ s l
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Figure 1.  Inequality in farm sizes, pumping rates, and income 
 
In Figure 1, parameters are:  8 . 0 = γ ,  3 . 0 − = z ,  100 = n ,  50 = m ,  , and 
.  Then the maximal farm income per acre is  .  At 
1 1 = h
000 , 100 = A
8 . 1 2 . 0 10 / × = A W
s 0 = Δ  
  20(i.e.,  ), small and large farms are the same, and the distribution of land 
ownership is uniform across farmers. Next we analyze the effect of an increase in farm 
size inequality on the equilibrium groundwater stocks, pumping rates, and incomes. 
1000 = = l s
As shown in Figure 1(a), when the difference in farm sizes is relatively small, 
, the difference in the pumping rates increases until the small farmers deplete 




1 , = = h ui k L i∈  and  50 ,..., 1 = k .  This limits the ability of 
small farmers to “steal” groundwater from their neighbors, and therefore, establishes an 
upper bound on the difference in the pumping rates.  Curiously, the large farmers pump 
less than the efficient quantity,   for  5 . 0 5 . 0 1
*
1 , = ≤ h ui k L i∈  and  100 ,..., 51 = k , when 
220, 400].  In this range, the gain in the dynamic efficiency for the large farmers 
outweighs the loss associated with letting the small farmers steal their groundwater.  
However, as the size of each large farm, and hence the total share of the aquifer farmed 
by large farms, increases, large farmers are able to more effectively “push” the aggregate 
groundwater use towards the efficient allocation.  Even though the incentive to pump 
groundwater efficiently for each individual large farmer declines, the aggregate 
groundwater usage in period 1 decreases.  This is because the distribution of total acreage 
is skewed more (less) heavily towards large (small) farmers, who pump slowly (who 
deplete their wells in period 1). 
[ ∈ Δ
Figure 1(b) illustrates the non-monotone relationship between the stock of 
groundwater in period 2 and farm-size inequality.  As explained earlier, when the gap 
between small and large farms is small,  [ ∈ Δ 0, 280], the large farmers are relatively 
ineffective in raising the dynamic efficiency.  This is because, even though they decrease 
their pumping rates in order to compensate for the higher pumping rates by small 
farmers, their weight in aggregate pumping is relatively light.  And so, the negative effect 
of the aggressive pumping by small farms dominates, and the groundwater stock in 
period 2 falls.  As the share of total acreage owned by small farmers declines, but their 
pumping rates remain constant (  for  1 1
*
1 , = = h ui k L i∈  and  50 ,..., 1 = k ), the large farmers 
need to give up less of period 1 pumping to push the region towards more dynamically 
efficient allocation.  From the perspective of a large farmer, the groundwater resource is 
more private, which reinforces the diminished influence of aggressive pumping by small 
  21farmers.  As a result, the average stock in period 2 increases, and the region moves 
towards a more dynamically (and spatially) efficient allocation. 
Figure 1(c) shows the non-monotone effect of the inequality in farm sizes on total 
income.  Proposition 4 shows that, in general, an increase in size inequality affects the 
total farm income in two distinct ways.  First, it affects the groundwater stock in period 2.  
Second, it affects the variability of the pumping rates among farmers in period 1.  When 
the gap is small,  0, 280], both the “stock” and “pumping rate variability” effects 
work in the same direction.  When the gap is “sufficiently” large, any further increase in 
farm-size inequality raises the total farm income.  Note that the dip in the total income in 
Figure 1(c) has a rather pointed peak.  This is because for 
[ ∈ Δ
280 ≥ Δ  there is an additional 
income gain associated with the gain in the spatial efficiency due to the decline in the 
heterogeneity of pumping rates.  The period 1 pumping on large farms increases, while 
pumping on small farms remains constant (as they deplete their wells in period 1).   
As shown in Figure 1(d), total per farm incomes are also non-monotone in the 
extent of farm-size inequality.  Surprisingly, the total small farm income increases when 
the acreage on small farms decreases in the range  [ ∈ Δ 0, 280].  The converse holds for 
large farms.  This is because small farms are in a better position to steal groundwater 
from their neighbors operating on large farms.  However, the cap on the pumping in 
period 1,  , eventually annuls this effect.  Consequently, a further increase in farm- 
size inequality affects farm incomes in the expected direction because, keeping 
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5. Risk-averse farmers   
So far, we considered the effect of farm-size heterogeneity on welfare in the case of risk-
neutral farmers (constant marginal utility of income).  As we show next, relaxing this 
assumption may lead to rather different conclusions.  Even the property that, under the 
competitive allocation, smaller farmers pump faster may no longer hold.   
We consider the case of risk-averse farmers with (strictly) concave per period 
utility of whole-farm revenues,  0 < ′ ′ v .  To highlight the role of risk-aversion, we assume 
that per acre profit (e.g., yield) is a linear function of the amount of water applied per 
  22acre, and that pumping costs do not depend on the hydraulic head,  .  
Following the same steps as before, we can show that the equilibrium best response of 
farmer   on acre  ,  , is  
u h u g = ) , (
k k L i∈
*
1 , i u
  ,  
*
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Let   denote the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk-aversion of a 
farmer with the periodic utility of income  . 
) ( / ) ( ) ( u v u v u u r ′ ′ ′ − =
v
 
Proposition 6.  Suppose that farmers are risk-averse. Then the average pumping rate is 
higher than the socially efficient average rate,  , and for all 
s u u 1
*
1 ≥ k L i∈ ,  ,  l L j∈ l k <  
a) smaller farms pump faster,  , if 
*
1 , i u
*
1 , j u ≥ 0 ≥ ′ r . 
b) smaller farms pump slower,  , if   
 and  .  
*
1 , i u
*
1 , j u ≤ ) ( ))) ( ( ( 1
1
1 ahA r ahA v a v r ≤ ′ +
−
] , [ l k a a a∈ ∀ ) 5 . 0 , 0 ( 1 h h∈
 
Farm size has two effects on the farmer’s pumping decision.  On the one hand, 
larger farmers view their stock of groundwater as a relatively more private resource.  This 
provides them with a greater incentive to push the regional use towards a dynamically 
more efficient allocation.  On the other hand, larger farmers may have a smaller 
(negative) difference in marginal utilities of income in periods 1 and 2.  This diminishes 
their incentive to push the region towards a dynamically more efficient allocation 
compared with smaller farmers.  The “private resource” effect dominates if the 
coefficient of relative risk-aversion is increasing in wealth.  The “income scale” effect 
dominates if the coefficient of relative risk-aversion is “sufficiently” large and decreasing 
in wealth (in the sense of condition in Part (b)). 
  While not reported here due to space constraints, the counterparts of Proposition 
3-5 carry over to the case of risk-averse farmers as well.  Competitive allocations may 
either exacerbate or alleviate income inequality associated with the distribution of land 
holdings among farmers.  If the coefficient of relative risk-aversion is increasing in 
  23wealth, small farmers pump more groundwater per acre than large farmers.  This lessens 
the income inequality caused by an unequal distribution of acreage.  The converse is true 
if larger farmers pump more aggressively (on a per acre basis), which is possible if the 
coefficient of relative risk-aversion is “sufficiently” large and decreasing. 
Note that, in the absence of the effect of farm-size inequality on the disaggregated 
pumping rates, from the societal point of view, the heterogeneity in land holdings is 
immaterial if farmers are risk-neutral (i.e., they value marginal income in both periods 
independently of the number of acres they farm).  When farmers are risk-averse, the 
heterogeneity in the pumping rates can be welfare-increasing, given that the per acre 
irrigation rates increase on smaller farms and decrease on larger ones, so that in period 1 
income is redistributed from rich to poor farmers (see Proposition 1).  However, because 
of the decreasing marginal per acre benefits of water, total income always decreases 
under a greater variability of the pumping rates.  This may create a tension between the 
effects of farm-size inequality on income distribution and total income (output).  Next we 
take a policy perspective and investigate the workings of a very simple groundwater use 
policy in the presence of farmer heterogeneity. 
 
6. Policy implications: an example of flat-rate quota policy 
In this section, we consider some political economy aspects of implementing a simple 
policy that allocates per period per farm pumping quotas.  Suppose that the policy takes 
the form 
q A u k L i i
k ≤ ∑∈
*




2 , ∑ ∑ ∈ ∈ − + ≤
k k L i i k k L i i u q A q A u  for  ,       (15)  n k ,..., 1 =
where   is the per acre quota (measured in acre-feet), and the quota allocated to 
each farm is proportional to its size.  The quota limits the quantity of groundwater 
extracted in each period, but allows farmers to carry over unused portions of their quota 
into the next period.  There is no market for water rights, and the unused quotas cannot be 
bought or sold. 
] , 0 ( 1 h q∈
For concreteness, we consider the case of risk-neutral farmers and a strictly 
concave agricultural output function analyzed in Section 4.  The following result 
establishes that, while this policy always slows the rate of the aquifer depletion, the effect 
on farmer incomes is likely heterogeneous.  We consider equilibrium where the pumping 




1 , i i u u ≥ L i∈ ∀ , so that  .  For example, this is 
always true if all farmers are sufficiently small relative to the aquifer,   
.  Then, under quota policy (15), farmers do not 
transfer the unused portion of their quotas from period 1 to period 2:  , if 
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The income of farmer k  under the quota policy is 
 ( { ) ( g A q k k = π , q )} , ( ) 1 1 q h q g h − + , if  2 / 1 h q < ,  and    (18a) 
 ( { ) ( g A q k k = π , min[q ) )], )); ( ( ( 1 1
*
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1 h h q u h f a g k u −
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From (18a) it follows that all farmers lose (gain) from a more restrictive quota, if the 
initial quota is sufficiently small and the marginal benefit of a higher stock is “small” 
(“large”) relative to the marginal benefit of water consumption:  k k A q q = ∂ ∂ / ) ( π  
) , ( { 1 h q gu 0 ) ( )} , ( ) , ( 1 1 ≤ ≥ − − − + q h q g q h q g h u  for all  n k ,..., 1 = .  On the other hand, 
from (18b) it follows that the income of large farmers, who are not bound by the quota, 
increases because the quota policy slows down the average pumping rate in period 1. 
Let  .  Note that   is a non-
increasing function.  Then farmers 
} 1    )), ( ( / ) , ( : sup{ ) (
*
2 1 n k q h f h q g a k q m u k ≤ ≤ ≤ = ) (q m
) ( ,..., 1 q m k =  are bound by the quota in period 1.  
Also, farmers   deplete their wells in period 1, where   
symbolizes the absence of the quota policy. 
,..., 1 = k ) ( 1 h q m = 1 h q =
 
Proposition 7.  Suppose that the quota is applicable,  .  Then under the 
groundwater quota policy 
q h q u ′ > = ) ( 1
*
1 , 1
1 h q q < ′ =  
a) the groundwater stock in period 2 increases,  ) ( ) ( 2 1 2 q q h h q h ′ = < =   .  
Suppose that the period 2 quota is not binding, 
1 h q < ′ ∀
2 / 1 h q ≥ ′ .  Then 
  25b)  large farmers gain,  ) ( ) ( 1 q q h q k k ′ = ≤ = π π  for  n q m k ,..., 1 ) ( + ′ = ; 
c)  small farmers lose,  ) ( ) ( 1 q q h q k k ′ = ≥ = π π  for  ) ( ,..., 1 1 h m k = , if (i)  , 
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Farmers in the medium size range,  ≤ ) ( 1 h m ) (q m k ′ ≤ , may lose or gain from a quota.  
The intuition for this result is very clear: Small farmers, who pump faster than the 
average farmer, stand to lose the most from a quota policy.  Large farmers, who are not 
restricted by the policy, strictly gain from the quota because of the more stable inter-
seasonal allocation of groundwater induced by this policy.   
This illustrates that policies that do not account for user heterogeneity, are likely to 
affect not only the inter-seasonal but also the spatial distribution of incomes among 
farmers.  The ensuing political economy issues and the relative weight of small and large 
farmers in the policy-making process pose additional constraints on the design of 
efficient groundwater management policies. 
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Proof of Proposition 1: First, note that in period 2, the planner optimally exhausts the 
remaining stock on each farm because g and   are strictly increasing. This implies that 
constraint (1) binds for t = 2 (i.e.,  = h
v
s
i u 2 , 2  L i∈ ∀ ), so that (6) can be written 








i + = ∑∑ =∈
Because ∑  is symmetric and concave in  , and   is symmetric in  , 
optimality requires that   for any 
∈ k L i t
s
t i h u g ) , ( ,
s
i u 1 ,
s W (.) v
s
i u 1 ,
s
j u 1 , = k L i∈  and  l L j∈  if  l k A A = .  Additionally, 
corner solutions are ruled out because   and   are increasing and concave in each 
argument.  Substituting the law of motion (2),  , into the objective function and 
differentiating, the first-order conditions for a maximum are  
v g
s u h 1 2 1− =
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) (
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1 1 1 1 1
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if  , and  , otherwise, for all  1 1 , h u
s
i ≤ 1 1 , h u
s
i = k L i∈  and  n k ,..., 1 = .  Part (a) follows by 
observing that (A) reduces to (7) when  0 = ′ ′ v  because  A A
n
l l = ∑ =1 .  Part (b) follows by 
observing that only the first term in (A) depends on farm size  , and, by concavity of 
utility function,  , it decreases with  .  Then by concavity of yield function,  , this 
implies that   is a non-increasing function of farm acreage. ■ 
k A
v k A g
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Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose that  .  Then, by (11) 
*
1 1 u u
s >
*
1 u ∑ = =
n
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The inequalities follow by concavity of  .  The equality follows by (7).  And so, we 
obtained a contradiction.  Also, 
g
*
1 , i u , min[ 1 h = )] ); ( ( 1 2
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− , min[ 1 h ≥  
 for any  )] ); ( ( 1 2
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− *
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The first inequality follows because the sum of compositions of two concave functions: 
, is Schur-concave in  .  To show this, we need to 
check that   is concave in  .  Differentiating twice yields 
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where the inequality follows by condition in (a).  The second inequality follows by 
concavity of  .  And so, we obtained a contradiction.  g
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The equalities follow because, by b(i) and concavity of  ,  g 1 1
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inequality follows because, by b(ii), 
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−  is Schur-convex 
(see Part (a)).  The second equality follows by assumption.  And so, we obtained a 
contradiction. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4:  
To show parts (a) and (b), we need two facts. 
Fact 1. (i)  )]) ( , (min[ ) ( 1 k k k k a u h g Aa a = π  is concave in   when  k a P R ≤ 3 . 
 (ii) 
1 ) ( ) (
h a u k k
k a
< π  is convex in   when  , where  k a P R ≥ 3 ) ); ( ( ( ) ( 1
*
2
1 h A h f a g a u k u k
r
− = .   




) , ( (





) ( 1 h u g
af
h u g A
a




















2 )] ), ( ( [ ) (
1 a













) ( 3 (
) , ( ) ( 1
2
u R




= 0 ) ( )) ( ≥ ≤ − u P . 
depending on whether  .  This proves Fact 1(ii).  To show Fact 1(i), note that 
 by monotonicity of 
P R ) ( 3 ≥ ≤
)]) ( , (min[ 1 k k a u h g a )] ), ( ( ), , ( min[ 1 1 1 h a u g a h h g a k k k = g .  Hence, 
 is concave in   when  )]) ( , (min[ 1 k k a u h g a i a P R ≤ 3  as a composition of concave 
functions. 
Fact 2.  .  0 /
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c
Proof:   inherits the sign of    
, where the inequality follows by concavity of  .  
Keeping everything else equal, as the extent of dynamic inefficiency of the competitive 
allocation increases, welfare falls.   
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The first inequality follows because function  ) (A W
r
 is Schur-concave as the sum of 
concave functions by a(i) and Fact 1(i).  The second inequality follows by a(ii) and Fact 
2.  
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The first inequality follows because, function  ) (A W
r
 is Schur-convex by Fact 1(ii).  The 
equality follows by b(ii).  The second inequality follows by b(iii) and Fact 2.  ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 6: Suppose that  .  Then, by (A) and (14) in the text, 
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The inequalities follow by concavity of  .  And so, we obtained a contradiction.  v
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Part (b). Proof is analogous. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 7:  
Part (a). Note that this trivially true when the quota is binding in period 2,  , 
because then  , and 
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where the last inequality follows by concavity of  .  And so, we obtained a 
contradiction. 
g
Part (b). By (18b), farmer k ’s income for  n q m k ,..., 1 ) ( + ′ =  is  
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where the inequality follows by Part (a), and monotonicity and concavity of  .  g
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The first inequality follows because  ) ( 1 h m ) (q m ′ ≤ , which follows by concavity of g .  
The second inequality follows because, by (17),  ) (
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since, by c(i),  
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The third inequality in (A3) follows by c(ii).  Hence,  ) ( ) ( 1 h q q q k k = ≤ ′ = π π  for 
 because   ) ( ,..., 1 1 h m k = 0 / ) ( ≥ ∂ ∂ q q k π  for all  ] , [ 1 h q q ′ ∈ .  ■ 
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